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INTRODUCTION
In modem property jurisprudence, one frequently comes across
references to the "bundle of rights." Though by no means the only
property metaphor available, jurists and scholars have employed the
bundle-of-rights picture for over a century.' The metaphor has fre-
quently found its way into judicial opinions,2 and it is almost trite to-
day to note that property, properly understood, is nothing more than
the ownership of a bundle of rights.3 However, to state clearly and
analytically what that metaphor means, let alone to explain how it
should guide judicial decision making, is much more difficult.4 In the
I See, e.g., JOHN LIWis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN =H UNITED
STATES § 55, at 43 (1888). As Lewis commented in his 1888 treatise, "[t]he dullest individ-
ual among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of
rights." Id.
2 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) ("The difference to peti-
tioner, of course, is the loss of her ability to exclude others. As we have noted, this right to
exclude others is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property.'"); Compton v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 16 N.E. 110,
117 (Ohio 1888) (using the bundle-of-rights metaphor).
S SeeJ.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711, 713
(1996) ("The prevalence of the [bundle-of-rights] paradigm is undeniable.").
4 Indeed, commentators have made few attempts to provide a thoroughgoing theo-
retical analysis of the bundle-of-rights metaphor. See Penner, supra note 3, at 733 ("If there
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absence of a normative theory underpinning the understanding of
property as a bundle of rights, the use of the metaphor in any given
case will not aid in the decision-making process. In other words, the
very metaphorical nature of the bundle of rights renders it indetermi-
nate when applied in actual cases. Because the metaphor is funda-
mentally indeterminate, its use in judicial opinions often reflects the
subjective impressions of the judges on the bench more than the ap-
plication of a well-constructed legal doctrine.
The bundle-of-rights picture5 probably began as an intuitively ap-
pealing description of certain practical legal effects deriving from
something being someone's "property." A.M. Honor66 and Wesley
Hohfeld 7 elaborated this idea, but scholarly exegesis generally has had
little impact on its use in the courts. Yet the metaphor persists and
has increasingly been the subject of intense analysis by legal scholars
and judges in the latter part of this century.8 Perhaps this scrutiny
reflects the perceived need for an objective and systematic schema to
apply in the proliferating Takings Clause cases.9 Or perhaps scholars
feel that the bundle-of-rights metaphor superimposes too much for-
malism on the judicial process, creating the belief that one must parse
out all of the "sticks" from the disputed property right.10 Whatever
the reason, in the past few decades important scholarly works have
was ever any real possibility that a radical Hohfeldian version of the bundle of rights would
serve as a new basis for understanding property, it has not materialized."). Indeed, Pen-
ner's article is devoted in part to demonstrating that the bundle-of-rights metaphor, far
from being a model of property, "is really no explanatory model at all, but represents the
absence of one." Id. at 714.
5 It is inappropriate to label the bundie-of-rights conception of property a theory,
given its failure to coherently explain the bundle's structure and the dearth of mechanisms
to apply to actual cases. Professor Penner suggested that it "is little more than a slogan."
Penner, supra note 3, at 714.
6 SeeA.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (AG.
Guest ed., 1961).
7 See WESLEY NEWCOmB HOHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied inJu-
dicial Reasoning I, in FuNDmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTONS 23, 28-31 (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., 1923).
8 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, TheDisintegration of Property, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY 69,
69-73 J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter Nomos]. Grey
argued that property today no longer functions as a unitary legal concept, in part due to
the bundle-of-rights metaphor and its gradual infiltration into legal analysis. See id. at 81-
82.
9 The Takings Clause states: "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10 I believe this observation is an essential ingredient in Professor MargaretJane Ra-
din's personhood conception of property. SeeMargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 959-61 (1982) (arguing that property is defined by what is essential to
personhood, not by analytic rules).
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attempted to sort out the meaning of the bundle-of-fights metaphor
and how best to incorporate it into (or out of) property law.1'
The concept of property has been the subject of heated debate in
the context of takings law within these scholarly works. Moreover, in
the last five years the Supreme Court has declined to clarify its con-
fused precedents concerning what constitutes property under the
Takings Clause.12 The development of takings law by the Federal Cir-
cuit thus provides an appropriate introduction.' 3
This Note examines how the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has explicitly or implicitly handled the bundle-of-rights meta-
phor in the context of its Takings Clause cases. In particular, the
Note makes two points. First, it argues that the Federal Circuit has
attempted to give normative meaning to the bundle-of-rights meta-
phor by making the weight and nature of each right in the bundle, as
well as the size and scope of the bundle itself, dependent on objective
11 See, e.g., Grey, supra note 8 (exploring how the bundle-of-rights metaphor contrib-
utes to the disaggregation of the legal concept of property); Penner supra note 3, at 711
(critiquing the very possibility of a bundle-of-rights theory of property); Jeanne L. Schroe-
der, Chix Nix Bundle-o-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MicH. L. REv.
239 (1994) (employing a neo-Hegelian reading of property and eschewing the bundle-of-
rights theory).
12 The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning Fifth Amendment takings
jurisprudence is City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1638 (1999) (de-
ciding, inter alia, that the issue of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is one coming under the
Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial). The most recent Supreme Court case examin-
ing the issue of what constitutes property for Fifth Amendment purposes is Dolan v. City of
Ligard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13 Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994), pursuant to its power under Articles I and IlI of the
Constitution to establish "inferior Courts," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 9. In creating the Federal Circuit, Congress desired in part to give greater uni-
formity to certain areas of law. Thus, the Federal Circuit is a court of exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction, serving as the sole court of appeals within certain statutorily defined
subject-matter areas. See generally Hon. S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the
Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Mode
39 Am. U. L. REV. 853 (1990) (reflecting on the history of and the policies behind the
Federal Circuit); Hon. Randall R- Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Process, 40 Am. U.
L. Rxv. 1003 (1991) (critiquing legislative debate over the establishment of the Federal
Circuit). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has exclusivejurisdic-
tion over a limited number of designated subject-matter areas. SeePlager, supra, at 854 n.2.
The Federal Circuit is also a nongeographical court; like the United States Supreme Court,
it does not need to consider the regional origins of the cases it hears to pass on its jurisdic-
tion. See 15A CHARLEs ALAN WRmG1r ET AL., FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE JURIsDIC-
TION § 3903.1 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining the jurisdictional scope of the Federal Circuit).
One of the subject-matter areas over which the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction is Fifth Amendment takings claims against the United States. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a) (2) (1994) (granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over
certain cases wherein the United States is defendant); see also id. § 1295(a) (3) (1994)
(granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over appeals from the Court of Fed-
eral Claims). Therefore, since the passage of its enabling legislation, the Federal Circuit
has become the principal forum for appeals from the district courts on federal takings
claims.
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factors such as state and common law. Second, this Note asserts that,
by articulating the controversial doctrine of "partial takings," the
court has thwarted that attempt.
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the origins of the bundle-of-
rights metaphor, including Professor Hohfeld's attempt to transform
it from metaphor to full-fledged theory. Part II asserts that the theo-
retical inadequacies of the bundle-of-rights metaphor have rendered
it of little use to judges in their considerations of Takings Clause cases.
Part I then discusses the Federal Circuit's takings opinions; it argues
that the Federal Circuit has begun to formulate a means by which
courts can objectively identify the bundles at issue in specific cases, as
well as the individual rights contained therein. This Note concludes
by demonstrating how the Federal Circuit's creation of the partial-tak-
ings doctrine has severely undermined these efforts.
I
THE "BUNDLE OF RIGHTS" AS METAPHOR AND
NORMATIVE "THEORY
The origins of the bundle-of-rights metaphor are cloudy. Yet at
least as far back as 1888, commentators could remark that "[t]he dull-
est individual among the people knows and understands that his property
in anything is a bundle of rights."' 4 The early understanding of prop-
erty, however, did not approach academic sophistication. Rather, the
phrase "bundle of rights" denoted the common acknowledgment of
the practical ramifications accompanying the legal moniker "prop-
erty." Thus, according to John Lewis, the bundle-of-rights metaphor
was rooted in the layperson's instinctive sense that ownership of a
thing meant, in practical terms, "the right to dispose of a thing in this
way or that, the right to use a thing in this way or that, the right to
compel a neighbor to desist from doing this or that" and so forth. 15
Lewis further noted that laypersons "constantly act upon this under-
standing [of property as a bundle of rights], although they may never
have formulated a definition of the word and would be at a loss to do
so."16 To excessively speculate as to the characteristics of the bundle-
of-rights conception this early in its history would be ill-advised. Suf-
fice it to say, Lewis understood the rights which comprised the bundle
to be the classic property rights of use, exclusion, and disposition.' 7
Wesley Hohfeld first attempted to construct a theory of property
out of the bundle-of-rights metaphor.' 8  Property, according to
14 LENis, supra note 1, § 55, at 43.
15 1& at 44.
16 k
17 See i& § 54, at 41.
18 See HoHiiiw, supra note 7, at 28-31.
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Hohfeld, is properly understood neither as things nor as particular
relations to a thing, but rather as an essentially abstract set of legal
rights-usually with respect to tangible things. 19 Crudely put, the
bundle-of-rights metaphor expresses the sense that when one owns a
thing, the essential property relationship is not between the owner
and the thing, but between the owner and non-owners.20 For exam-
ple, my cup is "my property," not because some special relationship
exists between the cup and me, but because others have duties to me
regarding the cup and I do not have corresponding duties to them.
In other words, the metaphor suggests that one can delineate a prop-
erty interest solely by reference to the owner's rights vis-A-vis other
people and their rights and duties towards the owner, usually though
not always with respect to some tangible thing.21 This view contradicts
the Blackstonian notion of property as something over which an indi-
vidual has "sole and despotic dominion,"22 for Blackstone's definition
does not acknowledge that the dominion itself is a function of inter-
personal relationships.
Ownership under the bundle-of-rights metaphor represents
rights that one is entitled to vis-A.-vis other people.23 Property, then,
consists of abstract legal rights and interests.2 4 Thinking of property
in this way accommodates some of the complexities of modem prop-
erty law: multiple ownership of a single thing, ownership of future
interests such as reversions and remainders, and the endlessly varied
19 See id.; see also Leif Wenar, The Concept of Prperty and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 1923, 1926 (1997) ("According to Hohfeld, property cannot be things, like land or
breweries; property can only be property rights--the rights over things."). Penner suggested:
[I]t is a refusal, which we may tentatively attribute to Hohfeld, to consider
property in the old way, as a right to a thing, which provides the basis for
the bundle of rights picture.... [H] enceforth, property will be character-
ized as a complex aggregate ofjural [(i.e., interpersonal)] relations, not as
a particular relation between owner and object. Henceforth, property is to
float free from any anchorage to the concept of a "right to a thing."
Penner, supra note 3, at 731.
20 See Penner, supra note 3, at 724-34 (surveying Hohfeld's and Honor6's visions of
the bundle-of-rights conception of property ownership).
21 Although Hohfeld attempted to unmoor property from its dependence on a
"thing" by articulating interpersonal rights and duties, he did not articulate how to do this,
so a notion of thinghood still attaches to our use of the term "property." See id. at 733
(noting that the bundle-of-rights picture has not led, as Hohfeld believed it would, to a
thing-free approach to property).
22 2 SIR WILLIAM BLAcasroNE, COMMENTAIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 2 (11th ed.
1791). Blackstone famously characterized property as "that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclu-
sion of the right of any other individual in the universe." Id.
23 See Penner, supra note 3, at 712-13.
24 Throughout this Note I refer to the understanding of property in the constitutional
sense. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1668 (1988) (defining "'constitutional prop-
erty'" as "either the set of property rights that are thought to be of constitutional status, or
the practice by which the Supreme Court attempts to protect those rights").
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ways of splitting up things into rights capable of market transfer.
Hohfeld's rigorous abstraction of the concept of property thus had
the pleasing consequence of accommodating the ever-progressing
splintering of property into finer and finer rights and interests.2 5
While Hohfeld, 26 and Honor6 following him,27 articulated the
view that abstract legal rights constitute the correct understanding of
property, they did not provide a blueprint for exactly which legal
rights comprised the essential rights in the bundle. In other words,
any possible subdivision of the classic property rights of exclusion, dis-
position, and use are arguably individual legal rights of the owner as
well and thus are properly considered "property." The nearly infinite
subdivision of ownership rights28 means, in turn, that those interested
in doing so can whittle down the property itself into smaller and
smaller interests, because no theoretical basis exists to justify distin-
guishing one legal interest from another.29 In short, while Hohfeld
severed property from its mooring in the concrete and unifying no-
tion of property-as-thing ownership, he did not sufficiently articulate
the internal structure of the bundle of rights so as to prevent individu-
als from viewing the most marginal legal right as frll-fledged property.
This theoretical lacuna enabled the doctrine of conceptual severance,
like that voiced by Richard Epstein, to arise.30
Viewing property metaphorically as a bundle of rights does not in
itself carry ramifications for practical jurisprudence. Only when cou-
pled with a normative mechanism for application to actual law does
the bundle-of-rights picture of property begin to yield practical legal
effects. We may picture property ownership as possession of a bundle
of rights, but this picture does not inform us of what sticks are in the
bundle or what their interrelationship is with one another, let alone
whether fragments of them amount to property in the constitutional
sense. This ambiguity renders application of the bundle-of-rights pic-
ture in actual cases very difficult.
25 See generally BRUCE A. Ac.ER.AN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977)
(detailing the benefits and drawbacks of an Hohfeldian "scientific" conception of
property).
26 See HOHFELD, supra note 7, at 28-31.
27 See HonorS, supra note 6, at 112-24.
28 The creativity of buyers and sellers of property in the marketplace is the only limit-
ing factor on the number and nature of transferable legal interests in property. See Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1572 n.32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Property
interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive.").
29 See Wenar, supra note 19, at 1928 ("[B]ecause there is no 'essence' to property,
every stick in a property bundle itself counts as property."). Furthermore, the difficulty of
defining what constitutes a stick in the bundle prevents exclusion of certain legal interests
not on par with other sticks in the bundle.
30 See RicHAuD A. EpsTEIN, TAmINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMrNENT
DoMAIN 57-62 (1985).
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According to the Fifth Amendment, a taking is compensable only
if the taking is of "property."31 If property is defined as a bundle of
rights, one must determine what rights are essential to that bundle,
what minimum rights standing together constitute property, and what
rights the government can abrogate without such action constituting a
taking of property. How one views the internal structure of the bun-
dle thus becomes essential to identifying when a compensable taking
has occurred. But the raw metaphor itself does not provide clues for
this analysis. A conception of the bundle of rights that prescribes how
the law will treat a particular legal interest in a particular situation and
how the impairment of one interest affects the others in the bundle is
necessary.32 This observation is nothing new. In fact, it has been the
focus of much debate and reflection over the past thirty-plus years
during which takings jurisprudence has exploded.33
Professor Radin's influential 1988 article touching on the rela-
tion of the bundle-of-rights metaphor to takings jurisprudence identi-
fies a normative version of the bundle-of-rights metaphor that carries
serious legal implications. 34 Conceptual severance for the purposes of
Takings Clause cases35 views any conceptually distinct aspect of a per-
son's property as a separate strand within the bundle of rights-as
property itself.3 6 Following this reasoning, the taking of a strand con-
stitutes a compensable taking of property under the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution. Of course, this assertion is true only if one first
31 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32 It is critical to keep in mind that conceptual severance describes a jurisprudential
technique, a way of applying the bundle-of-rights metaphor so as to yield a determinate
outcome in Takings Clause cases. See Radin, supra note 24, at 1674-80. To suggest that the
bundle-of-rights metaphor itself provides such an algorithm would be a mistake. Concep-
tual severance, on the other hand, is capable of directing how a judge should rule in tak-
ings cases. Unless one follows Richard Epstein and treats as property every conceptually
distinct aspect of a larger whole, one will have to specify conditions which determine what
strands of the bundles qualify. See EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 57-62. Professor Radin has
argued-at least in the case of temporal takings-that drawing such boundary lines is im-
possible and that the only choices are either to apply a multifactored balancing test or to
accept the radical version of conceptual severance. See Radin, supra note 24, at 1675-76.
33 Federal CircuitJudge Nies wrote that "[n]o legal subject has received the attention
of scholars more than 'takings' jurisprudence in recent years" and that " [a] flood of litera-
ture has been produced advocating various theories of property and social responsibili-
ties." Torida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1574 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). Although takings law provides
most of today's cases on the legal nature of property, this phenomenon is an historical
contingency that the growing number of takings cases has caused. Substantive due process
law, Contract Clause cases, and perhaps intellectual property cases all might come to refine
the legal definition of property.
34 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1674-78.
35 Although Professor Radin discusses conceptual severance in the context of takings
cases only, I do not see any reason why conceptual severance is not applicable to other
property-related matters. So far, most conceptual-severance discussions have focused on
takings exclusively.
36 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1676.
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accepts the view that any conceptually severable aspect of property is
itself property in the constitutional sense.37
Richard Epstein most dramatically articulated this "strong" ver-
sion of conceptual severance in his influential book, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.38 This book prompted Profes-
sor Radin to coin the term "conceptual severance."39 Although Pro-
fessor Epstein never expressly used the term conceptual severance, his
work clearly espouses that technique.40 Professor Epstein recognized
that the Hohfeldian bundle-of-rights picture of property could logi-
cally require compensation for any alteration of any of the incidents
of property within the bundle.41 Professor Epstein wrote that "[n]o
matter how the basic entitlements contained within the bundle of
ownership rights are divided and no matter how many times the divi-
sion takes place, all of the pieces together, and each of them individu-
ally, fall within the scope of the eminent domain clause."42 Professor
Epstein could conclude this because, in neglecting to articulate an
internal structure of property rights within the bundle, Hohfeld im-
plied that all property rights were equally property, whether consid-
ered separately, together, or in part, and no matter how marginal the
value of the right.4 3 This view meant that the government would have
to compensate many, if not most, individuals adversely impacted by
governmental regulations; such government responsibility was not a
drawback for Professor Epstein. 44 To him, conceptual severance is the
proper technique to apply when evaluating regulatory takings claims;
he assumed that the underlying purpose of the Takings Clause is to
produce maximum utility and efficiency of property and that requir-
ing compensation for the most marginal property value diminutions
leads to greater efficiency.
37 Professor Radin attributes this strong view to Professor Epstein. See id. at 1677-78
("[Als soon as one adopts conceptual severance,. . . there is an easy slippery slope to the
radical Epstein position. Every curtailment... of property, every regulation of any portion
of an owner's 'bundle of sticks,' is a taking of the whole of that particular portion consid-
ered separately.").
38 EpsTmN, supra note 30.
39 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1667.
40 See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. Rav. 1600, 1615 (1988) ("To
appreciate the implications of conceptual severance, one need only recall that it is exactly
the approach for which Richard Epstein argues ... ").
41 See EPsran, supra note 30, at 57-58.
42 Id. at 57.
43 See Wenar, supra note 19, at 1928 ("[B]ecause there is no 'essence' to property,
every stick in a property bundle itself counts as property.... [Furthermore,] if each stick is
property, then removing a stick from someone's bundle must be a taking regardless of
what other sticks remain in the person's bundle (if any)."). Professor Epstein wholeheart-
edly embraces this neo-Hohfeldian conception. See id. at 1935-36.
44 See EpsTiN, supra note 30, at 281-82.
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While the debate over conceptual severance continues in aca-
demic circles, government institutions have grappled with the bundle-
of-rights legacy, apparently without arriving at a definite position on
the matter. For instance, in 1995 the United States Senate considered
the passage of a bill that would have, among other things, partially
codified a conceptual-severance view of property.45 The aim of the
bill was to afford greater protection to property owners in the face of
expanding federal regulations.46 Title V of the bill required compen-
sation for statutory use restrictions on land or interests in land47 aris-
ing from the mandate of either the Endangered Species Act 48 or
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.49
Title II of the bill even more closely paralleled Professor Epstein's
version of conceptual severance. Tide II required compensation for
reductions caused by a federal act of one-third or more of the market
value of "any interest defined as property under State law; or.. . un-
derstood to be property based on custom, usage, common law, or mu-
tually reinforcing understandings sufficiently well-grounded in law to
back a claim of interest."50 As Professor Michelman remarked, "[t] his
expression... potentially encompasses sundry interests in all forms of
personal property (tangible goods, securities, intellectual property,
commercial contract rights, and other intangibles) as well as real
property (land and various claims related to land)."51
Although Title V applied to only two acts and Title II applied to
many, both potentially could be interpreted as voicing the doctrine of
conceptual severance. Under Title V, "any interest in land"52 could
include easements, servitudes, air rights, and so forth, but the terms of
the bill did not limit the provision to these traditional categories of
property interests.53 In fact, any aspect of land ownership that one
could conceivably sell is potentially a land interest and thus potentially
compensable. This result is even more obvious under the language of
45 See Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. § 204(a) (1995).
The bill was reported to the Senate by Senator Orrin Hatch on December 22, 1995. The
Senate Judiciary Committee filed a floor report on March 11, 1996. S. Rept. 104-239. The
bill was not called for a vote.
46 See Frank I. Michelman, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Pub-
lic Works, June 27, 1995, 49 WASH. U.J. UaB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 5 (1996) ("The bill, then, is
precisely aimed at granting certain property owners anti-regulatory protections in excess of
those allowed them by courts applying the Constitution.").
47 See S. 605, 104th Cong. §§ 501-510.
48 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
49 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
50 Id. § 203(5)(E)-(F).
51 Michelman, supra note 46, at 3.
52 S. 605, 104th Cong. § 502(5) (B).
53 See Michelman, supra note 46, at 6 n.13 ("By making a sufficiently aggressive use of
these definitions, any application whatsoever of any sort of land regulation could easily be
held compensable.").
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Title II, which relies on the amorphous term "mutually reinforcing
understanding" to define property interests. Accordingly the bill
seemed to apply to any land regulation or other regulation that deval-
ues by one-third or more any aspect of property, no matter how slen-
der the interest, "on the theory that it totally devalues a conceptually
severed 'portion' of property."54 Although this bill was a radical appli-
cation of the technique of conceptual severance, it was arguably not
the most radical.55
The Supreme Court had not fully embraced conceptual sever-
ance at the time Professor Radin wrote her seminal paper.56 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has seized few opportunities to clarify its
position on conceptual severance and takings law.57 Many commenta-
tors feel that the Court's definition of property is ill-defined.58 Should
the Court ever choose to refine its position, it would almost certainly
look to the line of takings cases in the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit. Because of the Federal Circuit's unique jurisdictional
mandate, it hears more Takings Clause cases than any other court of
appeals.59 Thus, more than any other federal appellate court, the
Federal Circuit has had to grapple with the Supreme Court's concept
of property in the context of takings jurisprudence. In particular, it
implicitly has had to decide to what extent it must employ the tech-
nique of conceptual severance in determining whether or not a taking
has occurred.
II
THE SupmREM COURT AND CONICEPTUAL SEVERANCE
This Part suggests only the limited proposition that, if the
Supreme Court has used conceptual severance to decide certain tak-
54 Id.
55 One could imagine, for example, a compensable claim for a devaluation of less
than one-third under a rigorous conceptual-severance view.
56 For instance, the Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), found a taking of property when a municipal government required a public-access
easement as a condition of development of plaintiff's lot, but in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), declined to find a taking of property when a
municipal statute precluded development of plaintiff's air rights. As these cases show, the
Supreme Court will sometimes, but not always, find a taking when regulations remove one
stick from the bundle. As Part II demonstrates, little has changed in that respect. See
Radin, supra note 24, at 1676 ("The Court as a whole so far has been less willing than
Rehnquist to find takings by conceptual severance.").
57 The Court's most recent Fifth Amendment takings case did not directly address
what constitutes property, but rather focused upon defining a public purpose. SeeDolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1994).
58 See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining "Property"in the Just Compensation Clause,
63 FoRHAn i L. Rxv. 1853, 1853-55 (1995) (arguing that this lack of a definition of property
is "serious" and advancing a libertarian argument for a definition of property grounded in
state law).
59 See supra note 13.
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ings cases, it has done so neither consistently nor explicitly. Perhaps
realizing the severe practical ramifications on government should it
consistently apply conceptual severance, 60 the Court has employed
the doctrine in a limited fashion.6' To illustrate the Court's inconsis-
tency, this Part will briefly review certain of its pivotal holdings to
demonstrate that however the Federal Circuit uses conceptual sever-
ance, the jurisprudence is not necessarily derivative of the equivocal
Supreme Court precedents.
One can describe the history of twentieth-century Supreme Court
takings jurisprudence as an uneasy tension between the perceived
need for public regulation of property in accordance with the states'
police powers and the new Takings Clause conception of property as
abstract legal rights.62 While the states' police power and private
property interests arguably have always been the source of fundamen-
tal tension in Takings Clause cases, the uneasy balancing efforts began
in earnest with the seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.63
Prior to Mahon, the Court generally construed takings as the outright
physical occupation of the whole unit of property-usually land-by
the government.64 Some pre-Mahon cases, such as Pumpelly v. Green
60 As Justice Holmes famously remarked in his landmark opinion, Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law."
61 Some might say that the Court has employed the doctrine in a haphazard fashion.
Scholars attempting to make sense of the Court's precedent in this area call it "a concep-
tual muddle," Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L
REv. 9, 10 (1997); "a top contender for the dubious title of 'most incoherent area of Ameri-
can law,'"Jeanne L. Schroeder, Neverjam To-day: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence,
84 GEO. LJ. 1531, 1531 (1996); and a "convoluted doctrine," Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102
YALE L.J. 1077, 1080 (1993). Indeed, Bruce Ackerman remarked that "in many conversa-
tions on the [Takings Clause], I have not encountered a single lawyer, judge, or scholar
who views existing case-law as anything but a chaos of confused argument which ought to
be set right if one only knew how." AcKERMAN, supra note 25, at 8.
62 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1995) (stating that the Takings Clause is the "fulcrum
upon which private property interests are balanced against the State's police power" and
that Dolan accurately calibrated this balance); Michelman, supra note 46, at 8-9 (arguing
that the Takings Clause requires a "sensitive mediation" between "respect for private prop-
erty" and "respect for representative government's responsibility to discern and secure im-
portant interests" of the public as a whole).
63 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
64 See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEo. LJ. 813, 814 (1998) ("IT]he Takings Clause was originally understood to
apply only to physical seizures of property.... ."); Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Common Law
Rules and Land-Use Regulations: Lucas and Future TakingsJurisprudence, 3 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 3, 4-12 (1993) (summarizing early takings law). Modem case law has affirmed that "a
permanent physical occupation of property," no matter how trivial, effects a compensable
taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
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Bay Co.,6 5 acknowledged that indirect government action can physi-
cally occupy private property, resulting in a taking. Yet historically,
the Supreme Court has distinguished outright physical takings from
the more problematic regulatory takings. 66 Early on, pre-Mahon case
law did not classify regulatory restrictions of property rights as tak-
ings. 67 Likewise, the Court did not view mere economic diminution
of value as an outright occupation giving rise to a physical takings
claim.68 It was not until Mahon that the Court recognized government
regulations of use resulting in serious economic harm as takings of
property.
In Mahon, the Court enigmatically stated that a regulation's ad-
verse effects on property interests only constitute a taking if the regu-
lation "goes too far."69 Mahon involved a mining statute that required
that enough coal be left in the mine so as to provide subsurface sup-
port for a single, privately owned house.70 Even though the coal that
the statute affected was less than the total fee simple in subsurface
coal,71 the Court found that the regulation destroyed the value of the
entire support estate as defined by Pennsylvania law.72 Thus, one
reading of Mahon is that when a regulation causes a near-total diminu-
tion in value of a particular property interest, the regulation has gone
"too far" absent an overwhelming public interest concomitant to the
economic deprivation. Of course, the meaning of "too far" is the sub-
ject of dispute;73 one could argue that this disagreement is at the
heart of the regulatory takings debate.
The Mahon decision is seminal for recognizing a taking of a por-
tion or aspect of one's whole fee simple. As a physical occupations
65 80 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1871) (holding that a state-authorized dam which entirely
flooded plaintiff's property constituted a compensable taking).
66 See ERVIN CHEPMRINSKY, CONSrITUTIONAL LAWv: PRINCiPLs AND PoucrEs 506 (1997).
67 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (holding that a statute prohibit-
ing the production of liquor was not a taking of property, even though the statute de-
stroyed 90% of plaintiff's economic interest in the land); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of lust Compensation'Law, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1165, 1184 (1967) (stating that "[a]t one time it was commonly held that in the
absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable 'taking' could occur only through physi-
cal encroachment and occupation").
68 See Treanor, supra note 64, at 814 ("[I]t is generally accepted that the Takings
Clause was originally understood to apply only to physical seizures of property ... ").
69 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
70 See id. at 412-13.
71 See id. at 412, 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72 See id at 414.
73 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings Juris-
prudence ofJustice Holmes, 86 GEo. L.J. 875, 899-902 (1998) (exploring various interpreta-
tions of Holmes's decision in Mahon); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings
Issue Is Still a Muddle; 57 S. CAl. L. REv. 561, 563-71 (1984) (interpreting Mahon); Treanor,
supra note 64, at 822-31 (offering an interpretation of Mahon's significance).
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case, 74 Mahon suggests that a regulation goes "too far" when it inter-
feres with or physically occupies so much of the whole that it becomes
objectionable.7 5 "Too far" implicitly indicates that the determination
of a regulatory taking is therefore a matter of degree, 76 a measuring
unit of',the interference with the whole property interest.
But degrees of what;' Scholars have long debated the nature of
Justice Holmes's rationale. Generally, commentators have interpreted
Mahon to require either a balancing test or a raw diminution-in-value
test in these cases.7 7 Clearly, Holmes relied heavily upon the fact that
Pennsylvania law recognized the support estate as a separate identifi-
able estate.78 He also noted that the public interest in protecting the
subsidence of land under a "single private house" pales relative to the
great value of the support estate.79 The most critical factor, however,
appears to have been the complete devaluation of the support estate,
given that no alternative uses existed.
Mahon thus opened the door to conceptual severance. First, it
treated the support estate as a separate constitutionally protected
property interest, despite the fact that the coal company owned the
support estate as a part of the entire subsurface estate. In treating the
support estate as the property taken by the regulation, the Court tac-
itly acknowledged that in the future, it might conclude that regula-
tions affecting a particular right in a bundle constitute a taking of
property. However, the fact that the Court relied upon Pennsylvania's
prior recognition of the support estate as a separate estate entirely
mollifies the notion that the Court was engaging in conceptual sever-
ance.80 Second, the Court left open the possibility that a counter-
vailing public interest of significant weight could preclude the finding
of a compensable taking.81
Ultimately, Holmes's rationale in Mahon cannot provide an un-
ambiguous basis for the employment of conceptual severance in cases
in which government regulations have totally diminished the value of
some legal property interest.8 2 Mahon neither adopts nor rejects con-
74 See CHEMERINSY, supra note 66, at 510.
75 See id. at 511.
76 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416 ("[T] his [determination] is a question of degree-and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.").
77 See Treanor, supra note 64, at 823-26.
78 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
79 Id. at 413-14 ("The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited
.... On the other hand, the extent of the taking is great.").
80 See id. at 414.
81 See id. at 413 (stating that "usually" the public interest is insufficient tojustify such a
great diminution of a particular private estate).
82 Note that conceptual severance holds that one can characterize any diminution in
value as a total diminution of a whole property interest, depending on how we define the
interest.
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ceptual severance; rather, it provides fodder for both camps. The
Court has not settled on the exact nature of the test espoused in
Mahon. Following the Mahon decision, the Court has attempted to
hammer out a test for regulations, but these efforts have not resulted
in a clearer takings test, let alone a more definite stance on concep-
tual severance.8 3
Today, the Supreme Court recognizes several loose8 4 classes of
takings.85 Regulations that require a permanent physical occupation
of land, no matter how minor, effect a per se taking and the govern-
ment must compensate for any impairment.8 6 When no physical oc-
cupation occurs, the Court is most likely to find a taking when the
government effects a total deprivation of the reasonably expected eco-
nomic use of property. The Court has consistently held that regula-
tions that reduce the economic value of a certain unit of property to
zero constitute compensable takings.8 7 However, the Court makes its
decisions on an ad hoc, factual basis when regulations only marginally
reduce the value of a unit of property.88
The application of the diminution-in-value test will yield varying
results, depending on whether one employs conceptual severance.
These differing perspectives are apparent in the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.89 In Key-
stone, a statute prohibited mining that would cause subsidence. 90 The
plaintiff, a mining company association, facially challenged the statute
by asserting that it constituted a taking.91 On facts essentially identical
to those in Mahon, the majority stated that "[t]he 27 million tons of
83 See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 61, at 18-19 (noting that the Supreme Court often
decides land-use takings cases on a five-to-four split and noting the underlying "greater
confusion" in takings law).
84 I use the term "loose" because scholars have not adequately defined the categories
of takings. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 509 ("At the very least, these cases
illustrate that the distinction between a possessory taking and a regulatory interference is
often unclear.").
85 See generally id. at 506-13 (outlining the basic contemporary framework of Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence).
86 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(finding a compensable taking when a New York law required a landlord to allow a cable
company to attach cable equipment to its building, the effect of which the Court termed a
'permanent physical occupation"); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1871)
(finding a state-authorized dam which flooded plaintiff's entire property to constitute a
taking).
87 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (hold-
ing that a denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land" is a compensa-
ble taking).
88 See CHEMmuNsI , supra note 66, at 519 ("There is no formula; the cases concerning
regulatory takings reflect ad hoc balancing and the inevitable discretion in deciding what is
'too much' regulation.").
89 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
90 See id. at 474.
91 See id
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[support] coal do not constitute a separate segment of property for
takings law purposes... [and therefore t]here is no basis for treating
... petitioners' coal as a separate parcel of property."92 On this analy-
sis, the economic value of the legal interest in the affected coal is de
minimus relative to the whole. Clearly, conceptual severance would
have demanded compensation, for the regulation completely deval-
ued the whole legal interest in the support estate. The Court, how-
ever, refused to conceptually separate the support estate from the rest
of the bundle of rights in the subsurface estate. 93 It stated that, de-
spite the contrary finding in Mahon, "in practical terms, [in Penn-
sylvania] the support estate has value only insofar as it protects or
enhances the value of the estate with which it is associated." 94 In
other words, the Court refused to consider the affected legal interest
on its own, severed from the bundle, and instead viewed it in the con-
text of the entire bundle.95 The dissent, taking a conceptual-sever-
ance approach, remarked that "petitioners' interests in particular coal
deposits have been completely destroyed."96
Contemporary Supreme Court takings cases have wrestled with,
but not resolved, how Mahon applies in modem cases. Both the ma-
jority and the dissent in Keystone, for instance, read Mahon as employ-
ing conceptual severance to some degree, but only the dissent found
this portion of Mahon controlling. The majority strived to limit the
application of Mahon through its dicta in Keystone. The tug of war ap-
parently continued in the Supreme Court's recent case, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal CounciL97
In Lucas, a developer purchased a fee simple in beachfront land
intending to build single-family homes.98 Subsequently, the South
Carolina legislature adopted a coastal protection plan which effec-
92 Id. at 498.
93 See id. at 501.
94 Id.
95 The Court relied heavily upon Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), in which it
"viewed the right to sell property[, bald eagle feathers,] as just one element of the owner's
property interest." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500 (referring to the Andrus case). But see Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987) (holding unanimously that the right to devise property
is an essential stick in the bundle of rights, for which the government must compensate
when its regulations impinge that right). The inconsistency between Hodel and Andrus is
clear evidence of the uncertainty with which the Supreme Court approaches conceptual
severance.
96 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 514 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Yet even the dissent does not
endorse a full-blown conceptual severance view. The dissent would find a taking only if the
regulation "would allow the State not merely to forbid one 'particular use' of property with
many uses but to extinguish all beneficial use of petitioners' property." Id. The thorough-
going conceptual-severance view would require compensation for the elimination of any
legal interest, regardless of whether an alternative beneficial use exists.
97 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
98 See id. at 1006-07.
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tively blocked any development of the property.99 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Scalia found that any regulation that "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land" constitutes a tak-
ing.'00 Because the state trial court had decided that the property was
"valueless,"10' the Court held that the statute was a regulatory tak-
ing.10 2 Technically, Justice Scalia applied the diminution-in-value test,
because the relative economic worth of the property before and after
the regulation was the sole factor in deciding whether a taking oc-
curred. The holding, however, throws little light on whether the
Court employed conceptual severance, because Lucas dealt with the
devaluation of the whole fee simple estate, and not with the devalua-
tion of a conceptually distinct portion of it.103 Therefore, the Court
did not need to ask whether a distinct legal interest within the bundle
constitutes the whole unit of property for purposes of the Takings
Clause. Justice Scalia's dicta in Lucas, however, seems to imply that
the Court might apply conceptual severance in the future. 10 4 The
dicta-fast approaching the fame of Holmes's Mahon opinion-leave
open the door to future uses of conceptual severance.
In sum, the Supreme Court clearly regards any regulations that
totally destroy all economic or productive uses of the entire fee sim-
ple, or bundle (for lack of a better word), as takings. 10 5 In the more
ambiguous cases involving a partial economic diminution of the bun-
dle, a total deprivation of a discrete right in the bundle, or a weak
public interest, the "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" visible in the case of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City106 remains. The Court
supplements this inquiry with a tripartite set of factors: (1) "the eco-
nomic impact of regulation" on the plaintiff, (2) the interference with
"investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the character of the gov-
ernmental action." 10 7 As Professor Radin explained, 08 the battle is
now over whether to retain the ad-hoc, factual-inquiry model, or to
adopt a more determinate, rule-like scheme premised upon concep-
99 See id. at 1007.
100 Id. at 1015.
101 Kd. at 1007.
102 See id, at 1019.
103 Justice Scalia candidly recognized this limitation of the decision. See id. at 1016 n.7.
104 See id.
105 Note that, even in this categorical regulatory takings case, a governmental defense
for regulations which curb public nuisances exists.
106 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
107 Id.; see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (reaf-
firming the three Penn Central factors).
108 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1681 ("[T]he dialectic in takings jurisprudence ...
between the per se rule of Loretto and the balancing test of Penn Cetral... is simply an
instance of what has been called the dialectic of rules and standards.").
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tual severance or some other definition of property. As I have indi-
cated, this question remains very much open after Lucas.10 9
III
THE FEDERAL Ciacurr's VISION OF TAKINGs LAW
At the outset, I should note that I am not claiming that the Fed-
eral Circuit has created a new theory of takings law. Nor do I argue
that it has fully clarified the status of the bundle-of-rights metaphor or
of conceptual severance. The Federal Circuit, though, has tentatively
elaborated a view of takings which the Supreme Court has yet to
either definitively accept or reject." 0 In doing so, the Federal Circuit
has flirted with conceptual severance, thereby affecting how we view
the bundle of rights."' Specifically, the Federal Circuit has (1) fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's lead in Lucas by correlating the bundle to
common law understandings, and (2) created the partial-takings
doctrine.
Initially, the Federal Circuit attempted to give an internal, juris-
prudential meaning to the bundle-of-rights metaphor by defining,
case by case, the internal structure of the bundle in terms of common
law understandings and historical conceptions of the interests at is-
sue.1 2 In so doing, the court has tried to provide a means of deciding
whether a particular stick in the bundle of rights constitutes a separate
piece of protected property for the purpose of takings law." 3 As this
Note demonstrates, this effort by the Federal Circuit to correlate the
internal structure of the bundle of rights with common law rules and
historical vagaries actually operates to restrict and demarcate the use
of conceptual severance." 4
The Federal Circuit has, furthermore, attempted to articulate a
novel theory: the partial-takings doctrine. 1 5 The partial-takings doc-
trine holds that even if a regulation does not completely abridge or
109 The Federal Circuit has noted that, under the Lucas principle, regulatory takings
are compensable, but "the Court's decisions to date have not provided an answer" to the
question of whether partial regulatory takings are compensable. Florida Rock Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
110 Owing to the Rorschach test-like nature of Supreme Court precedent in this area,
courts have advanced competing conceptions of the "correct" interpretation of the Court's
precedent, each with significant textual support in the opinions. Therefore, I withhold
judgment as to whether the Federal Circuit's version actually diverges from the Supreme
Court's precedent. Such a determination undoubtedly will come only from the Supreme
Court itself, if it comes at all.
III See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVrL. Asr. L. REv. 509, 568-69 (1998).
112 See infra notes 156-96 and accompanying text.
113 See id.
114 See infra Part llI.B.2.
115 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir.
1994); see also Kendall & Lord, supra note 111, at 566 ("Judges Plager and Rader of the
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take a particular property right-a strand in the bundle-just com-
pensation may nevertheless be due. 1 6 The partial-takings doctrine in
many ways recreates the problems that the original failure to articu-
late an internal structure in the bundle of rights caused. That is, the
partial-takings doctrine eradicates the benefits of tying the structure
of the bundle of rights to common law understandings and historical
factors; it thereby leads down a slippery slope to Professor Epstein's
radical conceptual severance position, creating the negative conse-
quences widely noted by commentators.1 7 Thus, the two Federal Cir-
cuit innovations effectively cancel each other out, leaving the
Supreme Court to contemplate the straightforward, if somewhat more
sophisticated, version of Professor Epstein's conceptual-severance po-
sition looming in the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit has cautiously attempted to extract a coher-
ent meaning from the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, primarily
through its two most important regulatory takings cases, Florida Rock
Industries, Inc. v. United States1 8 and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States." 9 Although both cases presented facts that offered the court
an opportunity to either positively accept or definitely reject concep-
tual severance, intentionally or by miscalculation, the court declined
the invitation.
A. Physical Takings: The Right to Exclude
Before discussing regulatory takings cases in which the Federal
Circuit has asserted its position on takings law most distinctly, a review
of a few of its physical takings cases would be helpful. These cases,
though not groundbreaking, indicate the Federal Circuit's overall
strategy vis-a-vis takings jurisprudence:120 an embrace of property both
as comprising a bundle of rights and as conceptually severable. Fi-
nally, these cases show that although the Federal Circuit tacitly recog-
nizes that full-blown conceptual severance is undesirable, it fails to
provide a doctrinal means for preventing such an outcome, given its
embrace of conceptual severance with respect to the right to exclude.
Federal Circuit made a version of Professor Epstein's partial takings doctrine the law of the
land.").
116 See Kendall & Lord, supra note 111, at 568 ("[A]ccording to judge Plager, the Tak-
ings Clause treats [physical and regulatory takings] the same: whenever government action
impinges in any way on an owner's property, a court must look further to find whether a
taking has occurred."). This Note discusses the arguments for and against this doctrine,
and the rationale underlying it. See infra Part I1.B.3.
117 Commentators have attacked Professor Epstein's position on many fronts. See
Kendall & Lord, supra note 111, at 520 nn.44-46.
118 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
119 28 F.d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
120 In a sense, the Federal Circuit attempts to use the physical takings cases as a model
for all takings cases.
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The easiest case in which an asserted interest is conceptually sev-
erable from the bundle is the case of physical occupation. In the bun-
dle of rights, the right to exclude others -including the
government-is generally preeminent and certainly one of the oldest
and most respected.12 As discussed above, for most of this nation's
earlier years, courts defined a taking as an outright physical occupa-
tion by the government.122 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit in Hendler
v. United States123 reasserted that the right to exclude is "fundamental"
to the very notion of property and "to our theory of social organiza-
tion."1 24 In Hendler, the EPA, together with the State of California,
had installed groundwater monitoring wells on the plaintiffs' property
without their consent, pursuant to a plan to clean up contaminated
groundwater.125 The plaintiffs sued on a Fifth Amendment takings
claim 126 and the Federal Circuit found that the government action
amounted to a permanent physical taking of property. 27
The court based its holding upon precedential loyalty to the right
to exclude' 28 and doctrinal expositions of the bundle of rights. 129
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that all physical occupations, no mat-
ter how economically insignificant, are compensable. 30 This view of
the right to exclude is a version of the partial-takings doctrine, be-
cause it divides the supposedly monolithic property right (the right to
exclude) into ever smaller units. However, the Federal Circuit in-
serted a qualification at this point: a physical occupation of a short
enough duration may not be compensable.' 3 ' Ultimately, the court
hypothesized, a point exists at which the length of time of a physical
121 See, e.g., Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its
Past, in NoMos, supra note 8, at 28, 30-34 (stating that occupancy with the right to exclude
others was one of the first conceptions of property).
122 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
123 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Hendler involved an EPA order authorizing the
placement of pollution-monitoring wells on plaintiff's property. See id. at 1367. Under the
court's analysis, the wells themselves constituted a permanent physical taking. See id. at
1375-78.
124 Id. at 1375.
125 See id. at 1367.
126 See id. at 1367-68.
127 See id at 1376-77.
128 See id. at 1374-75 (citing, inter alia, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).
129 See id. at 1374 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890)).
130 See id. at 1375 ("A physical occupation of private property by the government which
is adjudged to be of a permanent nature is a taking, and that is true without regard to
whether the action... has only minimal economic impact on the owner.").
131 See id. at 1377 ("If the term 'temporary' has any real world reference in takings
jurisprudence, it logically refers to those governmental activities which involve an occu-
pancy that is transient and relatively inconsequential, and thus properly can be viewed as
no more than a common law trespass quare clausumfregit.").
604 [Vol. 85:586
CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE
occupation is insignificant; 132 at this point the violation of the right to
exclude no longer constitutes a compensable taking.133 This qualifi-
cation, however, is problematic.
The inherent difficulty in distinguishing an insignificant infringe-
ment on the right to exclude from a significant one is that, to distin-
guish on anything but an ad hoc basis, one needs another doctrine to
articulate a principled basis for drawing the significant-insignificant
boundary, because the physical occupation is either (1) an infringe-
ment on the right to exclude or (2) something categorically different
from an infringement on one's rights. If physical occupation is so
different, if the character of the action fundamentally transforms
solely because of a difference in the length of time involved, what ex-
actly is the nature of the action? And why has it changed? Needless to
say, the Federal Circuit did not offer answers to these questions in
Hendler. Indeed, the court barely acknowledged a line-drawing prob-
lem created by the significant-insignificant physical-takings distinc-
tion. Instead, it noted only that the facts in Hendler rested
"comfortably within the degree necessary to make out a taking."134
What is one to make of the Federal Circuit's two-steps-forward-
and-three-steps-backward equivocation in Hendler. Perhaps abstract-
ing the Federal Circuit's analytical strategy, which the court developed
in three phases, might be helpful. First, the court identified a sup-
posed stick in the bundle of rights and indicated that the government
could not remove the stick (presumably as a whole) withoutjust com-
pensation.'3 5 This move seemingly indicates a resistance to the no-
tion of conceptual severance; the theory of strong conceptual
severance entirely bypasses the discussion of which "sticks" in the bun-
dle are removable, because an abridgement of any property interest
constitutes an uncompensated taking under the doctrine.'3 6 Second,
the court allowed for the possibility of compensation when the gov-
ernment has partially abridged a property right in the concrete
sense. 137 Thus, the court seemingly reversed its first position, quietly
allowing a degree of conceptual severance to take root. Finally, the
court held that some minimalistic subdivisions of the property right
are noncompensable, but failed to explain its reasoning.138 This final
132 See id.
133 See id. (noting that a "truckdriver parking on someone's vacant land to eat lunch is
an example").
134 Id
135 See id. at 1374 (identifying the right to exclude in the bundle of rights).
136 See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
137 See Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1376-77 (finding that physical takings that are temporary
and less than total are possible).
138 See id. at 1377 (noting that an infringement on the right to exclude, if short enough
in duration, would not be compensable).
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move thus restates the original problem with bundle-of-rights takings
analysis: a lack of a doctrinal basis for denying compensation for some
fragments of a property right, but not others. This analytical se-
quence is characteristic of the Federal Circuit's analysis in takings
cases and is one that it exported to the regulatory takings context:
identify a property right, allow certain fragments of that right to be
compensable, deny that all fragments are compensable, but fail to ar-
ticulate a way to distinguish between the two types of fragments.
Hendler is illustrative, particularly because it involved a strand of
the bundle of rights that the court considered more inviolable than
any other. Hendler is a clear case of a permanent physical occupation
in that the wells were built to last' 39 and were therefore overtly perma-
nent.140 The court's willingness, however, to speculate that some
physical occupations may be so short in duration as to be noncompen-
sable demonstrates that the right-to-exclude touchstone for the Fed-
eral Circuit must be something other than raw physical occupation.
In other words, the court will find a taking of the right-to-exclude stick
in the property bundle only upon a showing of a governmental physi-
cal occupation plus something. However, the Federal Circuit left this
plus factor undefined.141
The Federal Circuit's opinion in Hendler dimly indicates its early
stance towards conceptual severance; one can barely discern the two
takings moves mentioned above. First, the court strongly endorsed
one stick in the bundle of rights based upon precedent and tradi-
tional understandings of property. Second, it adopted such a flexible
view of this stick that it included virtually every instance of physical
occupation imaginable and only vaguely gestured at some doctrinal
cutoff point. These two moves indicate a desire to at least partially
articulate the internal structure of the bundle of rights, while at the
same time demolishing any potential jurisprudential benefit that
might emerge by adopting the partial-takings doctrine.
139 See id. at 1376 ("There is nothing 'temporary' about the wells that the Government
installed on plaintiffi' property .... The wells are some 100 feet deep, lined with plastic
and stainless steel, and surrounded by gravel and cement.").
140 See id, The fact that the government could have removed the offending well was
not sufficient to persuade the court that the occupation was not permanent. See id.
141 See id. at 1377 ("We need not decide here what physical occupancy, of what kind,
for what duration, constitutes a [physical] taking."). The Federal Circuit had an opportu-
nity to clarify the issue in Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Kirchdorfer involved a military seizure of a privately owned warehouse. See id. at 1576-77.
Although a contract controlled the military's access to the warehouse and the occupation
was "intermittent" and for a "limited duration," the court invoked Hendler and Loretto for its
finding of a permanent physical taking. Id. at 1582-83.
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B. Regulatory Takings: The Right to Beneficial Economic Use
While in the context of a physical-occupation takings case one
can see the quagmire that this strategy will eventually cause, one is
already in the quagmire in regulatory-takings cases. Two fundamental
difficulties arise in the context of regulatory-takings cases with respect
to the bundle of rights. First, how does one define the size of the
bundle at issue? This is the so-called "denominator problem." Sec-
ond, how does one identify the specific nature and weight of each
right contained within that bundle? The court must answer both
questions before a regulatory taking may be found.
Chief Judge Nies noted the denominator problem in Tabb Lakes,
Ltd. v. United States.142 Tabb Lakes involved a 167-acre tract of land
which, after initial purchase as a unit, the plaintiffs divided into five
sections for development 143 Plaintiffs developed sections one and
two and were in the process of selling them when the Army Corps of
Engineers learned that sections three, four, and five contained pro-
tected wetlands, which the plaintiffs were filling for future develop-
ment without the required permits."44 The Corps issued a cease-and-
desist order, which was to remain in effect until the plaintiffs obtained
the proper permits. 145 Eventually, the plaintiffs developed the three
wetlands sections and sued the government, alleging a taking of those
sections during the period of the cease-and-desist order.146 Setting
aside the question of temporary regulatory takings, Judge Nies noted
that the plaintiffs' claim of the loss of all economically viable use of
sections three, four, and five did not necessarily mean that the govern-
ment owed them compensation. 147 In dicta, Judge Nies wrote:
While in some cases it may be difficult to determine whether all
economic viable use of the 'property' has been destroyed [by the
regulation], that is not a serious problem here. Clearly, the quan-
tum of land to be considered is not each individual lot containing
wetlands or even the combined area of wetlands. If that were true,
the Corps' protection of wetlands via a permit system would, ipso
facto, constitute a taking in every case where it exercises its statutory
authority. 148
In other words,Judge Nies believed that even if the alleged taking had
drained all of the value from the disputed three sections of property,
residual economic value existed in the other two sections. Thus, be-
142 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
143 See id. at 798.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 798-99.
147 See id. at 802.
148 Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
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cause no complete taking of economic value from the "whole" prop-
erty had occurred, there was no taking.149
Tabb Lakes, like most regulatory-takings cases, concerns the right
to use a strand of the bundle of rights. The plaintiff claimed that the
development of property for sale, which is one facet of the light to
use, was the only "economically viable use" of the land under dis-
pute.150 Therefore, a regulation precluding the right to develop a
portion of the land constituted both an alteration of the right to use
and a diminution of the economic value of the land to the owner.' 51
The denominator problem arises when one questions the extent
to which the government may abridge the right to use through regula-
tion, causing diminution of value without paying just compensation.
Scholars have noted that much depends on how one defines the size
of the bundle to which the affected right, or interest, belongs. 152 Ac-
cepting Judge Nies's reading of the facts in Tabb Lakes, for instance,
forbidding the development of three of five sections of the parcel did
not constitute a taking of the right to use, because the order did not
completely destroy the right to use; rather, the plaintiffs could still
develop and sell the other two sections.153 However, if one argues as
the plaintiffs in Tabb Lakes did that the right to develop pertained only
to the third, fourth, and fifth sections, then the order entirely de-
stroyed the right to use and government compensation was due.15
Although Judge Nies believed that the bundle encompassed all five
149 Judge Nies's remarks were dicta, because Supreme Court precedent clearly stated
that "preliminary regulatory activity," like time spent applying for a permit, could not give
rise to a takings claim. IdL at 801 (emphasis omitted).
150 Id. at 799. Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon originated the total-deprivation-of-
any-viable-economic-use test. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text. To my knowl-
edge, no court has drawn a sound theoretical connection between the abstract right to use
and the concrete viable-economic-use standard. Of course, Richard Epstein attempted to
draw a rigorous connection. See EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 57-62.
151 Economic devaluation and the abstract right to use are really flipsides of the same
coin. When someone complains that a regulation has drained all or most economic value
from his land, he is really complaining about an uncompensated taking of his right to use
his land. While, practically speaking, some use value might persist in a completely eco-
nomically devalued parcel of land, such as birding or some other recreational use, courts
have inextricably intertwined the right to use with the right to cultivate financial value
from one's land. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 511 (stating that the tradi-
tional balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court for regulatory takings looks to "(1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regula-
tion has interfered with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the gov-
ernmental action").
152 See, e.g., John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking
Claims, 61 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 1535, 1550-57 (1994) (exploring the denominator problem in
regulatory takings cases).
153 See Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 800-02.
154 See id. at 801-02.
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sections, later Federal Circuit opinions155 reflect a much more sophis-
ticated method for defining the so-called parcel-as-a-whole, which pro-
vides the denominator for the fraction.
California Housing Securities, Inc. v. United States 56 addressed the
second problem mentioned above: defining the nature and weight of
rights contained within the bundle. California Housing involved a reg-
ulation which provided the placement in receivership and eventual
liquidation of savings-and-loan institutions under designated circum-
stances. 15 7 The plaintiff, California Housing Securities (CHS), had
purchased a savings-and-loan institution subject to these regula-
tions.158 Subsequently, Congress substantially altered the savings-and-
loan regulations,' 9 creating the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
and the Resolution Trust Company (RTC).160 Shortly thereafter, and
pursuant to its mandates, the RTC liquidated CHS's newly purchased
savings and loan.16' The plaintiff then sued under a Fifth Amend-
ment regulatory-takings claim. 162
In its disposition, the Federal Circuit held that, because banking
has traditionally been a heavily regulated industry, ownership of the
savings and loan included the "historically rooted expectation" that
regulations might provide for the seizure of the savings and loan upon
a finding of "unsafe or unsound ... practices." 65 That expectation
affected the court's view of the bundle of rights associated with the
savings and loan, as well as its perception of the individual property
rights contained therein. The court believed that, although the regu-
lations at issue were not in effect when the plaintiffs first purchased
the savings and loan, the owners knew or should have known that the
original regulations were likely to change.' 64 In particular, the plain-
tiffs should have anticipated the prohibition of certain banking prac-
tices, which might in turn result in the seizure and liquidation of the
savings and loan. 165 In a sense, the plaintiffs' imputed awareness of
155 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Both were au-
thored by Judge Plager, who has received widespread notoriety for his "revolutionary" ap-
proach towards regulatory takings. See, e.g.,James L. HuffmanJudgePlager's "Sea Change"in
Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FoRI-Dm EwNr. L.J. 597, 600-15 (1995) (favorably reviewing
Judge Plager's opinions in Loveladies and Florida Rock as a revival of the Takings Clause's
ability to protect private property interests).
156 959 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
157 See id. at 955-56.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 956.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 956-57.
163 Id. at 958 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164 See id. at 958-59.
165 See id-
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the regulatory context shaped the rights that attached to the savings
and loan's title. Thus, the revised regulations were not a taking, be-
cause the plaintiff s bundle of rights did not include the right to ex-
emption from this regulation of its business practices in the first
place.166
The Federal Circuit's reliance on historically rooted expectations
based on regulatory practices is more than a mere restatement of the
nuisance exception.' 67 In California Housing, the Federal Circuit
latched onto Supreme Court dicta under which courts were to deter-
mine property interests by reference to "existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law.' 68 In
turn, the questions of size and content of the bundle of rights in each
case were dependent upon such rules or understandings. 169 Histori-
cal expectations, particularly with respect to rules and understandings
of state property law at the time of the creation of the legal interest,
have blossomed into the Federal Circuit's touchstone for determining
the size of the bundle, as well as the weight and nature of the individ-
ual sticks within that bundle. 70  Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States171 most thoroughly developed this strategy for conceptualizing
and defining the bundle of rights. Loveladies presented facts which
allowed Judge Plager, writing for the Federal Circuit, to draw upon
rules or understandings to ascertain the nature of the bundle of rights
at issue.
166 See id.
167 Under the nuisance exception, regulations are not a taking if the regulated activity
constitutes a common-law nuisance. See generally John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of
Nuisance and the Takings Clause 18 COLUM.J. Emvrv. L. 1, 1-2 (1993) (examining the impli-
cations of the Supreme Court's holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 505 U.S.
1003 (1992), that legislatures may not augment nuisance restrictions and that the only
noncompensable nuisance restrictions are those that "'inhere in the title itself'" (quoting
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029)).
168 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (same).
169 See California Hous., 959 F.2d at 958.
170 George W. Miller andJonathan L. Abram first noted this trend in 1993. See George
W. Miller &Jonathan L. Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court of Federal Claims
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L. Rxv. 863, 863 (1993) (noting
that the Federal Circuit was "focusing on the regulatory scheme that governed the property
at the time it was acquired"). The authors rightly noted that the Supreme Court's Lucas
decision opened the door to defining takings by property owners' historical expectations.
See id at 864-65. The Lucas Court held that, in cases of regulations leading to total eco-
nomic devaluation, courts may deny compensation "only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his tide to begin with." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992). Thus, a court must delve into the various rules and understandings that make up
the "tile to begin with" to determine whether the proscribed use interest was in the bundle
that came with the land.
171 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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1. Loveladies
In Loveladies, the Federal Circuit confronted two key issues. First,
the court had to determine the size of parcel of land that can serve as
the denominator to the takings fraction: the affected parcel, a slightly
larger parcel, or a much larger parcel.'7 2 Further, the court ad-
dressed whether the bundle of rights, via the state's common law of
property, contained a governmental power to destroy use value.'7 3
Loveladies relied on a permutation of the ad hoc balancing test devel-
oped in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,174 which effec-
tively disallowed conceptual severance, because it required the court
to quasi-objectively identify the property interests contained within
the bundle with respect to state property law.'7 5 Therefore, although
the Loveladies court selected the affected parcel for the denominator
and thereby applied the per se rule, the court did not expressly en-
dorse conceptual severance. To view this as a mild victory for concep-
tual severance would be a mistake, for the facts appear closer to those
of Lucas, requiring the invocation of a per se taking rule.
The property at issue in Loveladies was a 12.5-acre parcel of land
which the plaintiff, Loveladies Harbor ("Loveladies"), purchased in
1958 as part of a 250-acre lot for development purposes. 7 6 Of the
original 250 acres, Loveladies had fully developed and sold 199 prior
to 1972, while fifty-one acres were yet undeveloped, including the 12.5
acres in dispute.177 The dispute arose after Loveladies applied to the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Conservation (NJDEC) for
fill permits for fifty acres containing wetlands.' 78 After lengthy and
contentious wrangling between Loveladies and state officials, the par-
ties reached a settlement whereby the NJDEC granted Loveladies a
permit to fill and develop 12.5 acres. 179 In return, Loveladies agreed to
leave the remaining 38.5 acres undeveloped and unfilled. °80 Lovela-
dies subsequently applied to the Army Corps of Engineers for a per-
mit to fill. 181 Following the advice of the NJDEC, that permit was
denied, prompting Loveladies to file suit in the Court of Federal
Claims.' 8 2
172 See id. at 1179-82.
173 See id. at 1182-83.
174 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
175 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-82.
176 See id. at 1173-74.
177 See id. at 1174.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 1174-75 (detailing the procedural history of Loveladies).
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The most relevant portion of the Federal Circuit's opinion is the
court's characterization of the Loveladies' property interest. Notably,
the court spent a fair amount of time at the outset comparing the pre-
Lucas (Penn Central) and post-Lucas balancing factors. 183 Recall that
in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,184 the Supreme Court in-
dicated that the balancing factors aid decision making in takings cases
when the taking constitutes a partial, rather than a total, deprivation
of economic value.185 In light of the fact that the court felt it neces-
sary to detail the differences between the pre- and post-Lucas factors,
the court likely viewed the Loveladies scenario as a partial taking. Nev-
ertheless, the court first addressed the issue of the nature and weight
of the right to beneficial economic use at stake before determining
whether the regulation accomplished a total or partial taking.
The court noted several factors to consider in ascertaining the
weight and nature of the affected property right. Generally, the bur-
dened use right must have been part of reasonable "investment-
backed expectations" on the part of the owner.' 8 6 That is, the plain-
tiffs must have "purchased the land involved with the reasonable ex-
pectation and intention of developing it over time for sale to
purchasers of the improved lots."1 8 7 The regulatory environment, his-
torically rooted expectations of potential prohibitions on certain
property uses, and other considerations are relevant to this factor. Be-
cause the property at issue in Loveladies was clearly of the sort that
owners often develop for sale, the court had little difficulty finding
that the bundle of rights contained the right to use.' 8
Turning to its own precedent in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v.
United States,'89 the court noted that it had drawn a distinction be-
tween regulations with shared effects and regulations which did not
dispense the detriments and benefits so as to secure "'an average reci-
procity of advantage to everyone concerned."' 190 In Florida Rock, the
court suggested that a regulation may negatively impact the right to
183 See id. at 1175-79.
184 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
185 See id. at 224-26. The Supreme Court termed total deprivation a "categorical" tak-
ing in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. The Loveladieks court expressly discussed the relevant consid-
erations in differentiating partial from categorical takings. See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179-
82. The court first noted that the Supreme Court in Lucas did not provide guidance as to
how to adjudicate the issue. See id. at 1179.
186 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179.
187 I
188 See id.
189 18 F.3d 1560, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
190 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). It is unclear from the opinion how exactly the court determined whether
the statute obtained reciprocity of advantage. The court apparently viewed this as a de
minimus devaluation concomitant with any viable regulation of land use that affects us all
and thus does not amount to a compensable taking.
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use only if the regulation is for the benefit of the common good, in-
cluding the plaintiff, and if the negative impact is equitably spread
across all beneficiaries of the regulation. 191 The court in Loveladies
did not evaluate whether the challenged regulations spread burdens
equitably, perhaps deeming it obvious that the burdens were not
evenly dispersed.
Finally, the court added that ultimately "state property law, incor-
porating common law nuisance doctrine, controls."192 The regulatory
environment at the time of the plaintiffs' original purchase of the
property at issue partially determines the nature and weight of a par-
ticular right in the bundle-here, the right to use. Unlike California
Housing, however, the actual regulatory scheme must be in place for
the state to regulate the use right. Therefore, the court must evaluate
law at the time of the purchase to determine whether invocation of
the state common law could have halted the proposed use.193 That is,
the state can only find that the intended use constitutes a nuisance
and subsequently regulate it, if the state has already expressly done so
by statute or at common law. 194 As the court stated, "[t]he question of
whether ... the state retained the power to impose a particular regula-
tory framework upon private property owners, as a matter of state
property law ... is a somewhat different question from the 'nuisance
exception." 1 95 Pursuant to these three factors, the court determined
that the title to the plaintiffs' property included a right to develop the
land and to sell it and that neither state regulatory framework, nor
nuisance limitation, nor reciprocal advantage qualified that right.' 96
However, the court's inquiry did not end after it determined that
the plaintiffs had a right to use and that the regulation effectuated a
taking of that right. The court still had to determine whether the
regulation affected the "whole" right to use of a particular piece of
property. Addressing the denominator problem, 197 the court noted
that its "precedent displays a flexible approach, designed to account
for factual nuances." 98 Part of the flexibility referenced by the court
emanated from Deltona Corp. v. United States,199 a case in which a devel-
191 See F/orida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570-71.
192 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179.
193 See id at 1183. How this factor interacts with the first factor-the owner's reason-
able expectations for use-is unclear. In other words, could the court have found that the
owner should have expected the wetlands to come under a regulatory framework prohibit-
ing development, despite the fact that no such framework was in place at the time of
purchase?
194 See id at 1182-83.
195 Id at 1182.
196 See id at 1183.
197 See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
198 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181.
199 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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oper owned a large tract of land, only some of which governmental
regulations blocked from development.200 The Court of Claims in
Deltona held that the regulations did not constitute a taking because of
evidence that a large portion of the tract was still amenable to devel-
opment and could fetch a higher price than the blocked portions.201
In contrast, in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States,202 the Surface Min-
ing and Protection Act of 1977 precluded a mining company from
mining any portion of a deposit.20 3 According to Loveladies, the
Whitney court found that the Act had effected a taking of all economi-
cally viable uses of the property based on extensive hearings on the
"purpose of the imposition, the nature of the property, its alternative
uses, and the extent to which all or only a portion of plaintiff's prop-
erty was so limited."20 4 Finally, the court remarked that "factual nu-
ances" under consideration included "the timing of transfers in light
of the developing regulatory environment."20 5
The Loveladies court held that the proper denominator was the
disputed 12.5 acres that the plaintiff wished to develop.20 6 The court
noted that the owner had already developed and sold off the 199 acres
years earlier, prior to the effective date of the regulation and that the
state of New Jersey received the 38.5 acres pursuant to the settlement.
Thus, according to the court, the unit of property was the disputed
12.5 acres, rather than a parcel conceptually severed from a larger
portion. After laying out the precedent and considering a partial-tak-
ings claim, the court calmly stated, "This is not... a case of a partial
taking."207
2. Loveladies Analyzed
What is one to make of the Loveladies case's flexible and factually
nuanced approach? Is itjust an application of the trend in favor of ad
hoc, factual inquiries to situations involving partial takings? One can
deduce a number of factors from the case and its citations. The court
placed a great deal of emphasis on whether the affected property was
part of a larger, valuable whole unaffected by the regulation. 208 The
court's discussion of Deltona implies that if the owner could still make
valuable use of most of the unaffected property, then the regulation's
impact on the whole of the owner's holding is minimal. However, if
200 See id. at 1192.
201 See id. at 1192-93.
202 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
203 See id. at 1172-73.
204 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181.
205 Id.
206 See id.
207 Id.
208 See supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
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the owner divides and disperses the whole prior to being subject to
the regulation, then for purposes of litigation the court would ignore
the original whole and the smaller portion would be the relevant de-
nominator.20 9 Likewise, the court was sensitive to subtle strategic ma-
nipulations by both sides of the table. The court noted that always
terming the disputed parcel the "denominator" might "encourage
strategic behavior on the part of developers."210 Thus, the fact that
the NJDEC chose to wait "until after the initial project had been ap-
proved for development, and until 199 acres had been developed" to
impose restrictions on development raised the question of whether
the government was behaving strategically.
This innovation in takings law is a modest one, building upon
Justice Scalia's Lucas dicta suggesting that "how the owner's reason-
able expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property"
determines the size of the property to which the affected interest be-
longs.21' The conceptual-severance adherent would have simply de-
clared the 12.5 acres the relevant property unit, the beneficial
economic use the regulation had impugned, effecting a taking. The
court would not have considered the possibility of a larger denomina-
tor, because the conceptual-severance doctrine disregards the denom-
inator problem and automatically treats the severed use interest as an
entire, free-standing unit of property.21 2 By leaving open the possibil-
ity of a larger denominator under different facts, the court avoided
aligning itself with the conceptual-severance camp. Conversely, the
Federal Circuit recognized that sometimes the facts of the case cou-
pled with fairness considerations21 3 dictate a court to find that the
denominator is less than the original parcel.
The Federal Circuit's approach, dictated by nuanced facts, state
property law, and the owner's reasonable expectations, is still an ad
hoc, case-by-case inquiry. There is, however, reason to suspect, even
209 Note that this result is consistent with Mahan to the extent that the coal already sold
is not relevant, and it concurs with Keystone to the extent that it includes all unmined coal
(including those unaffected by the statute) in the denominator.
210 Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181. Actually, the government made this argument, asserting
that the developers could "'convey [ ] away the non-wetlands portions of their parcels prior
to applying'" for permits. Id. (quoting the government).
211 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
212 This approach is the crux of Professor Radin's now-famous definition of concep-
tual severance. See Radin, supra note 24, at 1676 (stating that conceptual severance "con-
sists of delineating a property interest consisting ofjust what the government action has
removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been
permanently taken").
213 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181 ("It would seem ungrateful in the extreme to require
Loveladies to convey to the public the rights in the 38.5 acres in exchange for the right to
develop 12.5 acres, and then to include the value of the grant as a charge against the
givers.").
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from this one case, that in future cases the court will ascertain a lad-
ing-list of factors further objectifying the factual inquiry.2 14
Even so, the Loveladies reasoning was a departure from the highly
rational and abstract definitions of property that scholars previously
espoused.2 15 Both conceptual severance and the Blackstonian version
of property rely on highly abstract, theoretical notions of the composi-
tion of property in the constitutional sense, presuming it to be the
same at all times for all people. To Blackstone, natural law dictated
the nature and legal extent of an individual's property interest 216 For
conceptual-severance adherents like Professor Epstein,2 17 the terms of
the Constitution itself define property2 18 and this definition should
guide the courts' identification of an owner's property interest. Love-
ladies, in which Judge Plager tied the size of the bundle to contextual
and factual inquiries, expressed a different rationale. In Loveladies,
the Federal Circuit embarked on a new direction, espousing that the
size and content of the bundle of rights in question are a function of
both the facts and the history of regulation and ownership. Previ-
ously, courts had only employed ad hoc, factual inquiries in cases in-
volving partial takings. At least superficially, then, Loveladies embraces
Professor Radin's admonition that courts openly engage in pragma-
tism and reject conceptual severance, 2 19 even though the court viewed
the 12.5-acres as the denominator of a fifty-acre parcel.
How does this case help explicate the bundle-of-rights metaphor?
It apparently moves the bundle-of-rights paradigm a step closer to a
true normative theory and signals a retreat from its metaphoric status.
The Federal Circuit indicated that by buying property, selling portions
of it, and using it over time-all within the context of state and federal
laws recognizing certain interests and not others-one is defining the
size and set of rights of that property.
214 The court in F/orida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1994), shared this optimism. See id. at 1571 ("Over time, however, enough cases will be
decided with sufficient care and clarity that the line will more clearly emerge.").
215 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 20-22.
216 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
217 See EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 57-62. Professor Radin labels Professor Epstein's ap-
proach "Platonic," Radin, supra note 24, at 1670, but the Blackstonian view of natural law is
perhaps even more aptly denoted as such. Blackstone's view, after all, was founded on the
idea of a pure owner-thing relationship underwritten by natural law. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text. Professor Epstein's view, on the other hand, does not rest on any such
overt metaphysical platform, but allows property to change to accommodate the social
norm of efficiency. See EPsrIN, supra note 30, at 20-24. Nevertheless, conceptual sever-
ance is a contemporary legacy of Blackstone as Professor Epstein suggests. See id.
218 See EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 22-25.
219 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1680-81 (extolling the virtues of pragmatism in decision
making).
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3. Florida Rock
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States220 is another of the Fed-
eral Circuit's central cases on federal regulatory-takings claims. In
Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit did not have difficulty defining the
portion of the parcel to which the bundle of rights pertained; a de-
nominator problem did not exist as it did in Loveladies.221 Nor did the
court struggle with the nature of the property right affected; the prop-
erty right was a protected interest within the meaning of the Takings
Clause.2 2 2 Rather, the court faced a subsidiary problem: What if the
regulation had only a negative impact on the property right, but did
not actually destroy it? The Federal Circuit ultimately remanded this
issue to the Court of Federal Claims, authorizing it to find a so-called
partial taking should the facts warrant.2 23 Forida Rock represents both
a solo foray into partial-takings law and a subterfuge of whatever struc-
ture resided within the bundle-of-rights metaphor as adumbrated in
Loveladies.
The plaintiff, Florida Rock Industries ("Florida Rock"), had
purchased 1560 acres of wetlands west of suburban Miami in 1972.224
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act.2 25 Florida
Rock began to mine the subsurface limestone, but without the rele-
vant permit required by the Clean Water Act.22 6 After the issuance of
a cease-and-desist order by the Army Corps of Engineers, Florida Rock
stopped mining and proceeded under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act to apply for a permit to mine the entire 1560-acre parcel.2 2 7
Under the relevant regulations, the Corps only issued a permit for a
length of time sufficient to allow three years of mining.2 2 8 Thus, the
permit sought covered only ninety-eight acres.2 29 The Corps subse-
quently denied the permit, prompting Florida Rock to sue the United
States in the United States Claims Court on the ground of an uncom-
pensated regulatory taking of ninety-eight acres of its land.230 The
Claims Court found that the permit denial amounted to a total depri-
vation of economic value and, as such, constituted a compensable tak-
ing of the ninety-eight acres of wetlands.2 31
220 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
221 See id. at 1562-63.
222 See id. at 1563.
223 See id. at 1572-73.
224 See id. at 1562.
225 Seeid
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 1562-63.
229 See id.
230 See id. at 1563.
231 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 C1. Ct. 160, 164-65 (1985), affld in
part and vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the Claims Court's deci-
sion.23 2 In vacating the decision, the Federal Circuit stated that the
Claims Court had erred in failing to consider the "fair market value"
of the entire 1560 acres of wetlands after the permit denial.23 3 The
Claims Court, according to the Federal Circuit, had failed to consider
the residual economic value of the ninety-eight acres as a part of the
greater 1560-acre tract.23 4 Under the Claims Court's analysis, the per-
mit denial drained the ninety-eight-acre parcel of all its economic
value (and hence the right to use).235 Disagreeing with this reason-
ing, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for proceedings to deter-
mine the fair market value of the 1560-acre parcel and to see whether
that value was so far below the pre-regulation value as to constitute a
taking.23 6
On remand, the Claims Court heard evidence on both sides. The
government attempted to demonstrate that an existing market would
value each acre at around $4000, while the plaintiff argued that these
market estimates were unreliable.2 37 The Claims Court sided with the
plaintiff and declared the market value of the postregulation lands
relatively negligible.238 Therefore, pursuant to the total-economic-
deprivation theory, the Claims Court found a regulatory taking of the
plaintiff's 1560 acres.23 9
The government appealed and once again the Federal Circuit va-
cated the decision and remanded.24 The Federal Circuit held that,
based on the evidence before the trial court, a significant residual
market value of the whole 1560-acre tract might have remained.241
Therefore, the court could not find a regulatory taking on a total-
economic-deprivation theory.2 42 Should the permit denial diminish
the value of the 1560-acre tract to only a limited degree, per se takings
analysis would fail.
232 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
233 Id. at 903.
234 See id. at 903-05.
235 See Florida Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 166.
236 See F/orida Rock, 791 F.2d at 905.
237 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 172 (1990), judgment
entered, 23 Cl. Ct. 653 (1991), vacated, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
238 See id. at 175.
239 See id. at 176.
240 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
241 See id at 1567 ("The Court of Federal Claims' analysis was correct in theory, but
started from an incorrect premise-that the value of the parcel after denial of the permit
was a nominal $500 per acre.").
242 See id (determining that a fair market price precludes a finding that the regulation
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted)). The Federal Circuit treats the right to alienate one's prop-
erty in the market for value as a part of the right to use, not the right to dispossess. See id.
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The Federal Circuit then proceeded to elaborate its views on par-
tial regulatory takings. Initially, the court voiced the tripartite test
used by the Supreme Court in regulatory-takings cases: (1) "the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to
which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations,"
and (3) "the character of the Government action."243 But, in the pres-
ent case, the court insisted that the issue was primarily one of eco-
nomic impact.244 In doing so, the court found that Lucas stood for
the proposition that, in cases of total economic deprivation, no bal-
ancing of factors is necessary to determine if a taking has occurred.245
The facts of Florida Rock thus raised the question of whether and
when a raw diminution of value constitutes a compensable taking.246
In Mahon, the Supreme Court held that a taking had occurred, be-
cause the regulation had deprived the plaintiff of all the economic
value of a discrete property interest, namely the mining rights of the
subsurface support coal.2 4 7 Building on this seminal case, the Court
has found regulatory takings only when a regulation has destroyed a
whole discrete property interest.2 48 The definition of the property in-
terest at stake is thus all-important. The trend in Supreme Court tak-
ings jurisprudence was to not recognize marginal economic
devaluation as a compensable taking.249 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's
opinion for the majority in Lucas seems to hint that mere diminution
of overall value might be compensable.2 50 Coming as it did after Jus-
tice Scalia's Lucas dicta, F/orida Rock was arguably an attempt by the
Federal Circuit to make sense of the Justice's overture in favor of par-
tial takings. Although prior to Justice Scalia's Lucas dicta, no prece-
dent recognized partial takings, the Court had long grappled with the
question of how to approach regulations that diminished the overall
243 Id. at 1564.
244 See id. at 1567.
245 See id. at 1564.
246 See id at 1564-65.
247 See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
248 This observation excludes physical takings caused by regulations, such as the taking
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), which technically in-
volved a per se physical taking and not a regulatory taking. See id. at 421. More representa-
tive regulatory takings cases demonstrate the truth of this proposition. See, e.g., Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (holding that the denial of a build-
ing permit did not destroy all the beneficial economic use of the plaintiffs' parcel as a
whole).
249 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 644 (1993) ("To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is
always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is
all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question."). This opinion came after the Court's
opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
250 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. However, this conclusion was unnecessary, because
the taking in Lucas involved a complete confiscation of all the land in the suit, and thus
amounted to a per se physical taking. See id.
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market value of property without completely destroying any tradition-
ally recognized discrete property interest. The Federal Circuit
squarely confronted this very issue in F/orida Rock.
In Florida Rock, the court approached the partial-takings question
by dividing it into two sequential questions.25' First, the court asked
"whether a regulation must destroy a certain proportion of a prop-
erty's economic use or value in order for a compensable taking of
property to occur."2 52 Second, the court would decide, "in any given
case, what that proportion is."253 Despite Justice Scalia's Lucas dicta,
the Federal Circuit found that the Supreme Court had not yet de-
cided the first question and therefore had no opportunity to consider
the second.254 The court began by analogizing partial regulatory tak-
ings to physical takings claims255 and asserted that courts have always
held physical takings-no matter how functionally insignificant-to
be compensable takings. 256 The Supreme Court has found, for in-
stance, that government action resulting in a "relatively minor physi-
cal occupation [ ]" constitutes a compensable taking.25 7 Economic
harm in those cases was minimal, but the Supreme Court does not
consider the economic stakes if a takings claim involves an outright
physical occupation.258
Given this liberal attitude, Judge Plager suggested in Forida Rock
that regulatory takings are not theoretically different from physical
takings and that the judicial reticence in recognizing partial-regula-
tory-takings claims stems from the fear of "the difficult line that has to
be drawn between a partial regulatory taking and the mere 'diminu-
tion in value' that often accompanies otherwise valid regulatory impo-
sitions."259 Judge Plager noted that in Mahon, Justice Holmes
foreclosed future arguments that all regulatory diminutions in value
constitute compensable takings. 260 Conversely, Judge Plager noted
that to hold that none are compensable would conflict with consistent
post-Mahon Supreme Court precedent.261 Thus, when faced with a set
of facts indicating that a federal regulation had somewhat diminished
251 See F/orida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See id, (noting that on the partial-regulatory-takings issue, "the Court's decisions to
date have not provided an answer").
255 See id. at 1569.
256 See id.
257 Id. (citing, inter alia, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982)).
258 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (noting that "permanent physical occupation ... is
a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve").
259 Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1569.
260 See id
261 See id. at 1569-70 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)).
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the economic use value of the claimant's land, Judge Plager decreed
that the court must determine whether the diminution "has crossed
the line from a noncompensable 'mere diminution' to a compensable
'partial taking.'" 262 To answer the first question, the court must deter-
mine whether the regulation has destroyed a certain proportion of
the property's value so as to constitute a partial taking. By adopting
this conclusion, Judge Plager plainly followed Justice Scalia's sugges-
tion in Lucas that a partial destruction in economic value may consti-
tute a compensable taking.263
With regard to the second question in Florida Rock regarding what
proportion effected a compensable taking, the court implicitly as-
sumed that no bright-line percentage point triggered full compensa-
tion in every case. 264 Thus, the court rejected an absolutist approach
and instead decreed that the courts resolve each case using an "essen-
tially ad hoc factual inquir[y]." 265 Judge Plager had no concerns
about courts engaging in future "ad-hocery."266 Just as moderate
diminutions in value might trigger compensation, substantial ones
may be noncompensable. But how is one to draw the line? Judge
Plager gave scant guidance as to what factors are relevant to this deter-
mination. His guidance to the Claims Court included: whether the
regulation has benefited the claimant to such a degree as to offset the
loss of value (a reciprocity of advantage);267 whether the social bene-
fits of the regulations are borne by the many, and the economic loss
felt by the few; 268 and whether an alternative economic use could rea-
sonably mitigate the economic use lost.269 Ultimately, Judge Plager
resorted to a vague standard of fairness, asking whether "the Govern-
ment acted in a responsible way, limiting the constraints on property
ownership to those necessary to achieve the public purpose, and not
allocating to some number of individuals, less than all, a burden that
should be borne by all."270
262 Id. at 1570.
263 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
264 See Horida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570.
265 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). ElsewhereJudge Plager
said that "there simply is no bright line dividing compensable from noncompensable exer-
cises of the Government's power when a regulatory imposition causes a partial loss to the
property owner." I&t
266 Id. at 1571 ("[Olur decision today continues the tradition of ad hocjudicial deci-
sionmaking in this area.").
267 See id. ("[W]hen Government acts as the intermediary between private interests to
provide a mutually beneficial environment from which all benefit and in which all can
thrive, the shared diminution of free choice that results may not rise to the level of consti-
tutionally required compensation.").
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 Id.
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The Federal Circuit, as we have seen, had little difficulty identify-
ing the 1560-acre parcel as the "bundle" that contained all of the pen-
dant rights. Nor did the Federal Circuit hesitate to identify the
affected right as the right to beneficial economic use. A consistent
application of this reasoning should have led to the conclusion that,
because the regulators had not drained all beneficial economic use
from the bundle, there was not a taking, but rather a mere altera-
tion.27 ' Such a position would have articulated the doctrine that to
constitute a taking, a property right-the right to exclude or the right
to economically beneficial use-must be "significant" and the regula-
tion must take that right in its entirety.272 Instead, Judge Plager de-
creed that the "task" is to "resolv[e] when a partial loss of economic
use of the property has crossed the line from a noncompensable
'mere diminution' to a compensable 'partial taking.'" 273 In other
words, Judge Plager suggested that the abridgement of a particular
right to use does not have to result in the taking of that entire right to
be compensable.
However, focusing on this threshold obscures the fact that the
Fifth Amendment requires the taking of "property," not a portion or
part of property.274 Yet the Federal Circuit barely addressed the ques-
tion of whether the denial of a permit to mine the ninety-eight acres
constituted a taking of property in its entirety. The court glibly dis-
posed of this question in a footnote. The court wrote:
Identification of a specific property interest to be transferred to
the Government should pose little problem for property lawyers.
Property interests are about as diverse as the human mind can con-
ceive. Property interests may be real and personal, tangible and in-
tangible, possessory and nonpossessory. They can be defined in
terms of sequential rights to possession... and in terms of shared
interests .... There are specially structured property interests...
and there are interests in special kinds of things .... 275
The phrase "as diverse as the human mind can conceive" is particu-
larly revealing, for it indicates a willingness to accept seemingly any
aspect of any owned thing as property for the purposes of the Takings
Clause. The Federal Circuit thus appears open to novel property in-
terests, limited only by the ability of the human mind to conceptually
271 Judge Nies adopted this position in her dissent. See i& at 1573-81 (Nies, C.J.,
dissenting).
272 I do not endorse any particular right that I consider to be part of the bundle of
rights. I only argue that the partial takings doctrine eviscerates any doctrinal utility from
the bundle-of-rights picture, because it represents ajudicial refusal to give a consistent and
coherent meaning to that picture.
273 Rmida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1570.
274 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
275 Rorida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1572 n.32.
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distinguish them. Apparently, the court believes that whatever the
claimant has lost constitutes property; thus, the need to speculate as to
the nature of the reduction in value or the importance of the im-
pinged stick in the bundle should not exist.
In other words, in T/orida Rock, the Federal Circuit seemed to
adopt a conceptual-severance definition of property. Indeed, the
identification of a particular property right that the regulation has
abridged is somewhat irrelevant under Judge Plager's analysis. To
Judge Plager, any increment of economic value can and should be
characterized as property in the constitutional sense. 276 But if every
increment of economic value is constitutional property, then why
bother with the denominator problem at all? Indeed, why analyze the
rights at issue in the bundle in the first place? Courts need only focus
on compensating reciprocal benefits and determining the market
value of the property. Moreover, because all value is property, a dimi-
nution of one dollar is as much a taking as a diminution of one mil-
lion dollars, absent some additional doctrinal distinction.
The paradox of f/orida Rock, however, is that the finding of a tak-
ing of a property interest, as defined by the diminution, does not auto-
matically guarantee compensation, as it would have for a true
conceptual-severance adherent. Following f/orida Rock, a claimant
could lose an entire stick out of the bundle of rights, yet that stick
might not justify compensation. 277 Ironically, the crux of the F/orida
Rock analysis is the economic relationship of the stick to the bundle
and the economic relationship of the regulation to the claimant. 278
Thus, the case transformed the constitutional question of property
takings into a cost-benefit analysis.
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit's decision lessens the import of a
finding of a taking of a discrete property interest, for it states that
abstract property interests do not necessarily deserve protection from
government interference. The finding of a taking in F/orida Rock did
not depend on whether the property interest at issue was wholly
taken, for the court could rationalize any loss of marginal value under
the principle of reciprocal advantage. If the court determines that a
reasonable economic alternative exists, then even the taking of all the
mining rights of a whole parcel of land will not constitute a taking,
because the denial of one economic use of land is not unjust when
276 See id. at 1572 ("The dissent is concerned that what is being taken is 'value,' not
property. In fact, in a regulatory context such as this it is both.").
277 This result squares with the Supreme Court's decision in Andrus v. Alfard, 444 U.S.
51 (1979), in which the Court found that a government prohibition of the sale of bald
eagle parts did not constitute a taking, because it represented only one stick in the bundle.
See id. at 65.
278 See l/orida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1567-71.
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others are available. The Federal Circuit thus seems to have only par-
tially accepted conceptual severance.
Clearly, the Federal Circuit believed that any adverse economic
effects of federal regulation could legitimately constitute the total loss
of a property interest.279 But the court also implicitly held that this
rule does not reflect the meaning of the constitutional mandate: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use."280 Professor Radin
feared that courts might couple the clear language of the Fifth
Amendment with the conceptual-severance doctrine so that all regula-
tions with adverse economic impacts would be compensable. 281 This
approach would seem to be the logical outcome of characterizing all
economic losses as total deprivations of property. By forgoing this re-
sult, however, Judge Plager adopted an uncertain approach to the
Takings Clause. The Federal Circuit apparently reads the Takings
Clause as protecting citizens from arbitrary and capricious depriva-
tions of property allowing them to pursue their private interests with-
out the fear of unreasonable governmental interference. 282
Eschewing formal criteria for the terms "property" and "takings," the
court looked to the foundational justifications of the Takings Clause
in fairness and economic equity.
Finally, the Florida Rock court interpreted the constitutional re-
quirement of compensation for regulatory takings of property as sun-
ply one of economic equity. The central inquiry is not whether a
regulation has impugned a property interest (let alone which property
interest), but rather whether the regulation has threatened private
economic expectations. Therefore, the property that the Fifth
Amendment protects is not property in the classic Blackstonian
sense-the taking of a whole thing-or even the Hohfeldian sense of
abstract property rights, but rather raw economic use value as deter-
mined by pre- and postregulation market value. The upshot is less of
a redefinition of property in terms of conceptual severance, but more
of a redefinition as economic expectancy interests. Thus, one can al-
ways formally find a property interest in the historical sense of, say, a
negative easement in land, but such a finding is not legally essential,
279 See id. at 1568-70.
280 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
281 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1677-78.
282 See FHorida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571 ("The Government, in a word, must act fairly and
reasonably, so that private parties can pursue their interests."). Many commentators have
noted that the approach of the court after Lucas has been to examine the fairness of im-
posing burdens on a few property owners for benefits that accrue to society as a whole. See,
e.g., Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims
Court: Adjusting the Burdens That in Fairness and Equity Ought to Be Borne by Society as a Whole,
40 CATm. U. L. Rxv. 549, 563-66 (1991) (arguing that the Claims Court looks to factually
specific equity issues in determining if a taking has occurred).
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for the Fifth Amendment contemplates property as a quantum of eco-
nomic value.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit opinions in Loveladies and Florida Rock pres-
ent conflicting approaches towards determining what constitutes
property for the purposes of the Takings Clause. Loveladies provides
concrete and objective factors to consider when identifying both the
size of the bundle of rights and the specific rights within the bundle.
Florida Rock, on the other hand, undermines those efforts by charac-
terizing all economic value as constitutional property through the
doctrine of partial takings. This property-as-value theory is, in effect,
an abandonment of the conception of property as a bundle of rights.
It renders the size of the bundle irrelevant to a determination of a
taking and bypasses the need to identify whether the offending gov-
ernment regulation has completely taken a particular right. While the
Federal Circuit apparently believes that it can give more objective
meaning to the bundle-of-rights metaphor by recourse to state law and
reasonable expectations, such criteria provide little help to judges
when drawing the line between those partial takings that are compen-
sable and those that are not. The result may be a conception of con-
stitutional property more radical than conceptual severance, one
wherein any diminution in value is a compensable taking.
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